In this week’s eight things I liked and disliked, how the Utah Jazz found success avoiding a deep rebuild, the special connection between Jalen Williams and Chet Holmgren and how a trade that’s backfired has impacted the Atlanta Hawks’ awful defense.

Jump to Lowe’s Things:
Utah’s rebuild approach | OKC’s two-man game
Chicago’s broken defense | Kuminga’s new calm
Backfired Hawks trade | Duren’s offense
Free throw high-five purist | Dinwiddie’s conundrum

from 2009 to 2012. Those Rockets lost two tentpole stars — Yao Ming to injuries, Tracy McGrady in a trade — but never bottomed out.

They hovered over .500 for three straight seasons while their general manager, Daryl Morey, now running the Philadelphia 76ers, compiled assets he hoped to trade for their next foundational star. That player became James Harden. Eight seasons of high-level playoff basketball followed.

Those Rockets had a directive from ownership to avoid a deep rebuild. Utah’s brass had more leeway when it traded its two homegrown stars — Donovan Mitchell and Rudy Gobert. They received good players in return, but those were clear rebuilding trades — stocked with first-round picks from the Minnesota Timberwolves and Cleveland Cavaliers. The Jazz had no control over where those picks might fall. Utah’s own picks held the promise of high lottery talent.

For the second straight year, the Jazz are smashing expectations — even their own. Turns out, they acquired a tentpole All-Star in the Mitchell trade: Lauri Markkanen, matching his breakout numbers from last season and playing with more physicality on both ends. Collin Sexton, an afterthought in the Mitchell deal, is averaging 17 points on 49% shooting in Utah’s rejiggered starting five — a lineup featuring zero Utah draft picks, highly unusual for a rebuilding team.

That group does not have one “A”-level orchestrator, but everyone can keep the offense moving. The group’s turnovers have dropped. John Collins was a free talent upgrade who can play his natural rim-runner role with Walker Kessler coming off the bench. Kris Dunn is a terror on defense.

The Jazz are good enough that they may have no choice but to build up from the middle. They are ideally fortified to do so.

A year ago, with a similar record, Utah went the other way, dealing Mike Conley to snag a future first-round pick from the Los Angeles Lakers. Utah’s brain trust took a cold, hard look at last season’s feel-good team and kneecapped it with an eye on the future.

They ended up with three first-round picks: Taylor Hendricks (No. 9), Keyonte George (No. 16) and Brice Sensabaugh (No. 28). George is a keeper. Hendricks has looked good in limited minutes. The Wolves’ and Cavs’ picks are still coming.

There may be no equivalent step-back trade this season, and the Jazz don’t need to make one unless they receive an offer — for Sexton, Kelly Olynyk, Jordan Clarkson, Dunn — that is too good to turn down. They are deep enough to maybe trade one of those three and remain in the playoff race. Markkanen is 26. Sexton is 25. What’s the rush to go up or down?

Utah can be decent now, maybe bank some playoff experience, and stay primed to hunt big names on the trade market. That is building from the middle and has been done before — both on purpose, as with those pre-Harden Rockets, and somewhat by accident by teams who thought they were rebuilding but discovered they had stumbled upon a good roster. (Think of the Portland Trail Blazers in the season after LaMarcus Aldridge left, or the rag-tag Toronto Raptors in the wake of trading Rudy Gay.)

It’s hard to bottom out with an in-his-prime player as good as Markkanen. The same goes for Tyrese Haliburton, which is why the Indiana Pacers forked over Bruce Brown and three first-round picks to acquire Pascal Siakam — on an expiring contract — from the Raptors. In a nice bit of symmetry, the Pacers in prior weeks — before they were sure Siakam would be available — were one of several teams to call Utah about Markkanen, sources said. The Jazz in those brief talks showed zero interest in moving Markkanen, sources said.

Three picks sound like a lot for an impending free agent who is six years older than Haliburton and has hit just 33% career on 3s. But two of those picks will convey this season, meaning the obligation will not hang over Indiana’s head and hamstring its flexibility in future trades. One of those two picks will be in the 20s. If Indiana makes the playoffs, the other will be outside the lottery. There were other potential constructions where the Pacers might have sent out Bennedict Mathurin and/or Jarace Walker in lieu of some or all of those picks, but the Pacers chose those players over this specific set of picks, sources said.

Siakam is a perfect fast-break running mate for Haliburton. The Pacers can surround Siakam with shooting — including a stretch-center in Myles Turner who can space the floor while Siakam screens for Haliburton. Siakam can abuse mismatches and handle the ball in inverted pick-and-rolls with Indiana’s bevy of guard screeners — Buddy Hield, Andrew Nembhard and now maybe Haliburton.

Siakam can run the offense when Haliburton rests and brings tenacious multi-positional defense for one of the league’s worst defensive teams.

He may not be the perfect fit, but the small-market Pacers don’t get to shop at the superstar grocery store. They had no realistic method of tanking with Haliburton on the roster. They knew several teams — Utah, Oklahoma City Thunder, Houston — could outbid them on the trade market if someone better than Siakam ever became available.

The Pacers aren’t suddenly contenders now; assuming they make the playoffs, they will likely be first-round underdogs — especially if they face one of Boston, Philadelphia, and Milwaukee. (That said, the Pacers have Milwaukee’s number right now.) But that’s fine. They’re better today, and this roster is not Indiana’s end-point.

So they pounced, and the Pacers perhaps more than any franchise are veterans of ownership-mandated building from the middle. They did not pick higher than No. 10 from 1989 until they selected Mathurin at No. 6 in 2022 — the season in which they made the franchise-defining decision to flip Domantas Sabonis to the Sacramento Kings for Haliburton.

The Pacers originally acquired Sabonis and Victor Oladipo in exchange for Paul George — another classic build-from-the-middle deal in which the Pacers chose semi-proven young talent (Oladipo) over pick-heavy packages from the Boston Celtics and other suitors, sources said.

The Raptors aimed in this middle-build direction in the OG Anunoby deal, snaring Immanuel Quickley and RJ Barrett from the New York Knicks. They could not find an equivalent young talent in their Siakam negotiations, but netting three first-round picks — even middling ones — is solid enough when the alternative was losing Siakam for nothing or paying him the max. (They also added the Detroit Pistons’ 2024 second-round pick in the Anunoby deal.)

Tanking has never been a fail-safe or even close. It is even less profitable now given the new, flattened lottery odds. And sometimes things just happen. A player — Markkanen, for instance — takes a leap you didn’t see coming. A roster clicks into place because of talent and good coaching.

magic. If there were an easy answer to the Thunder’s offense, someone would have found it by now.

But there are (rare) nights when dialed in, switchy defenses gum up the works — and force Thunder ball handlers to manufacture tough one-on-one shots. Even Gilgeous-Alexander can’t roast guys every time.

The Thunder are unstoppable when they pass and cut their way to the rim more instead of always dribbling there. Holmgren should do more damage as a rim-runner.

Williams and Holmgren are building a special connection; Williams loves finding Holmgren with lobs. That connection might be the key to the Thunder offense staying afloat when Gilgeous-Alexander rests. Williams and Holmgren run those lineups, and the Thunder have found something by adding Vasilije Micic as a sort of co-point-guard; they’re plus-40 in 114 minutes with Micic, Williams and Holmgren together.

have lost the off-ball defense plot

The Bulls finished No. 5 in points allowed per possession last season; the biggest question entering this season was whether they could replicate that — or if it was borne of random bad opponent shooting.

The Bulls are 15th now, and 11th since Dec. 1 — a season-saving stretch in which they have gone 14-9. But a look under the hood reveals structural issues, including an avalanche of opponent 3s. A full 41.6% of opponent attempts have come from deep, the largest figure in the league. Only seven teams have allowed more shots around the basket; the Bulls are not coaxing 3s as a means of cutting off the paint.

Something is getting lost in translation from coaches to players, because the Bulls don’t appear to have any consistent idea for when and where to help away from shooters.

That’s a basic pick-and-roll with two shooters on the weakside and one — Lonnie Walker IV — in the strongside corner. The rules on that don’t change much from defense to defense: one weakside defender slides in to bump the roller. The second defender zones up between the two shooters. Walker’s defender — Coby White — stays home.

DeMar DeRozan sinks in on Dorian Finney-Smith, but White mimics that same rotation.

almost collide in triple-teaming Andrew Wiggins. Vucevic sloughs away from Kevon Looney. Fine. Why is White abandoning Klay Thompson in the corner?


4. The new calm of Jonathan Kuminga

Kuminga has gotten ahead of himself almost since entering the league, agitating for minutes and touches on a team stocked with legends.

But Kuminga has earned more time now. On the court, the Warriors are in disarray (and off the court dealing with this week’s death of assistant coach Dejan Milojević), at the point where they need to be thinking at least as much about next season — and restructuring the roster around Stephen Curry — as salvaging this one. That could mean tilting minutes toward younger players and exploring trades sending out veterans on long-term contracts — notably Wiggins.

Kuminga will never be a classic Steve Kerr cutter and ball mover. He will make tunnel vision mistakes — on both ends.

Even so, Kuminga has always been a little headier than his reputation. In the past six weeks, he’s finding better balance between playing within the Warriors’ beautiful game and breaking outside of it.

He’s improving as a cutter. He’s dangerous knifing to the rim out of the pick-and-roll, and he’s slowing down — picking out the right reads:

The calm is translating to his scoring:

A year ago, Kuminga might have plowed through Derrick Jones Jr. He sizes Jones up, beats him with a spin and eludes shot-blockers with a snazzy drop step.

Kuminga has been efficient on both isolations and post-ups, per Second Spectrum. He passes and records assists out of those plays at an above-average rate. He’s a foul-drawing machine.

This was maybe my favorite recent Kuminga play:

Curry was on fire down the stretch of that game. Kuminga had a path to the rim. He searched out Curry instead. That’s a Warriors play — a Draymond Green play.

Green is back from suspension, and the Warriors have to divide minutes among a lot of big men and non-shooters: Green, Kuminga, Wiggins (30% on 3s this season), Looney, Trayce Jackson-Davis.

The Wiggins-Kuminga minutes are a well-documented mess. The Kuminga-Green minutes have been shaky over the past two seasons; can Kerr play those two alongside a traditional center? Or does it work only in small-ball groups with Green at center — if it works at all?

and Orlando Magic this week snapped a distressing sting of helpless defensive performances for the Hawks. It is disconcerting to watch a team disintegrate that way — to see their lack of belief manifest in shoulder-sagging surrender. You feel a vicarious helplessness. The NBA is ruthless; the opponent will not let up. You morph into Apollo Creed’s trainer, screaming for someone to throw the damn towel.

The Hawks are 26th in points allowed per possession, but that undersells the carnage. Three of the four teams behind them are the Washington Wizards, Charlotte Hornets and Detroit Pistons — rebuilding teams. The Hawks have been in the playoffs three straight seasons.

There is no resistance at the point of attack, no urgency to help once that first layer is punctured, no communication anywhere.

That is an NBA team folding in real time. Dejounte Murray just watches Tyrese Maxey go by him. Perhaps Murray expects a screen from De’Anthony Melton. Maybe he assumes Melton’s man, Trae Young, will help on Maxey’s drive. There is no screen, and no help — until it’s too late.

Only the Pacers allow more shots at the rim than the Hawks. At least the Pacers can claim some logic: They stay home on shooters as a religion, even if doing so concedes driving lanes. Indiana yields the fewest opponent 3s. That part of the trade-off is working.

There is no trade-off for the Hawks. It is lose-lose-lose. They allow an average number of 3s and the third-fattest share of corner 3s. Clint Capela and Onyeka Okongwu have been OK as the last line of defense, but OK can’t stop the hemorrhaging.

De’Andre Hunter has never matched his reputation on defense. Saddiq Bey is average at best. Jalen Johnson’s injury derailed the Hawks, but he’s young. Peak Kawhi Leonard isn’t saving this.

The Murray trade has backfired. The Hawks expended a ton of draft capital to pair redundant, ball-dominant guards in a smallish backcourt.

Trading from a position of weakness is painful. If flipping Young is unpalatable — and sources said that indeed remains Atlanta’s stance — then trading Murray (among other moves) might be their only method of restructuring the roster and the cap sheet. Such inevitability might make it hard for the Hawks to get even 80% of what they traded for Murray.

(The Hawks control their first-round pick this season, but future picks they owe San Antonio stand in the way of any multiseason tank job — which is what a Young trade would likely entail. The Spurs reached out to Atlanta about Murray, sources said, pitching a sort of trade mulligan. Those talks don’t appear to have gotten far; there are other Murray suitors.)

is more well-rounded on offense than you think

Duren, still barely 20, walked into the league as a ferocious offensive rebounder and central-casting rim-runner — an alley-oop machine who would suck in help defenders and unlock 3s for shooters (once Detroit acquired some).

He showed flashes of a face-up game late last season, and is getting more adventurous:

OK, big fella! Duren sees Domantas Sabonis stumble, and knows the Pistons have an advantage. Duren stays under control, stands Keegan Murray up with a nice hesitation dribble, crosses it between his legs and finishes with a silky floater. (Duren has hit 49% from floater range, a tidy number.)

Duren can lead fast breaks or pivot into delay-style handoffs with Detroit’s guards and wings.

That’s an inverted pick-and-roll between Duren and Killian Hayes that draws a switch — with Kevin Huerter stuck on Duren. Duren bulldozes toward the paint with a steady handle, draws help and makes the right pass. Duren is dishing three dimes per 36 minutes — a nice rate for his age and position.

There is a long way to go. Duren has the tools to be an impactful, versatile defender — a hoppy rim-protector with the speed to switch onto any position. But the nuances aren’t there yet. Duren struggles with timing, angles and positioning. He sometimes defends with his arms at his sides.

, free throw high-five purist

DeMar DeRozan is the league’s most devoted between-free-throws high-fiver, to the point that he slaps hands with ghost players after technical free throws. It is one of my favorite little NBA things.

There is beauty in keeping the rituals of the game. It is an expression of love — respect for tradition, an acknowledgment that the basketball gods are watching. Given his style of play — selfless, tough, with dollops of creative genius — it is no surprise Anderson understands the sacredness of the free throw high-five. Watch him dangle his arm waiting for Karl-Anthony Towns:

That game featured some delightful free throw-related vengeance. In the first half, Rudy Gobert barely grazed the rim on the first of two attempts. Several LA Clippers on the bench — P.J. Tucker, Bones Hyland and Ivica Zubac — slid to the edges of their seats, snickering, as Gobert lined up his second attempt. It was an air ball. The bench crew hammed it up, linking arms, guffawing, almost falling over. Gobert nodded at them and trotted back on defense.

.

The Nets are 18th in offensive efficiency and 21st on defense. Only the Pistons and Milwaukee Bucks force fewer turnovers. Brooklyn rarely gets to the rim or the line. Outside of Day’Ron Sharpe’s offensive rebounding sprees and some grimy Dennis Smith Jr. defense, it plays with little force. You barely feel the Nets.

They have fallen to 16-24 after being swept by the Blazers (!), part of a sad four-team race — with the Hawks, Bulls and the remains of the Raptors — for the East’s last two play-in spots.

Dinwiddie is shooting 39% overall and 32% on 3s. He has attempted six or fewer field goals in five of Brooklyn’s past seven games — and only 16 2-point shots total in that stretch. That is a point guard in name only — floating, half-present.

Dinwiddie is averaging 14 drives per 100 possessions — the second-lowest rate of his career, per Second Spectrum. His shots at the rim are near a career-low level. Both numbers are tracking down. It almost looks as if Dinwiddie is on some kind of strike.

What makes this more bizarre is that Dinwiddie still ranks as one of the league’s most efficient pick-and-roll ball handlers — the precise skill Brooklyn so badly needs. The Nets have scored 1.23 points per possession on trips featuring a Dinwiddie pick-and-roll, per Second Spectrum — 14th among 166 ball handlers who have run at least 100 such plays. He ranks in the top 25% of that sample in assist rate (high!) and turnover rate (low!) out of the pick-and-roll. (That said, every Dinwiddie lob pass is an adventure.)

He’s just doing less in an offense centered at times around Mikal Bridges and Cam Thomas, and Dinwiddie is not a massive threat away from the ball.

That has always been the conundrum of Dinwiddie’s game: He’s best as an on-ball engine, but any team with Dinwiddie as the undisputed No. 1 ball handler isn’t getting far. For whatever reason, the Dinwiddie equation has tilted more of whack — and especially so lately.